Suspension, authority, and the futility of denial — by Umar Sani

The desperation of Nyesom Wike and his allies over the dismissal of their cross-appeal by the Apex Court continues to expose the weakness of their legal arguments. Instead of confronting the substance of the decision, they have resorted to semantics to mislead Nigerians.

Their latest claim is that the Court of Appeal’s judgment mentioned only A. K. Ajibade SAN and did not specifically mention Sen. Anyanwu or the rest. Therefore, according to them, the principle does not apply to others. That argument fails under basic legal scrutiny.

The issue is not about personalities but principle.

On page 26 of the cross appeal filed by Chief J. B. Daudu SAN before the apex court, the Court of Appeal made a categorical finding on the consequences of suspension under the Constitution of the PDP. The court held that once the NWC suspended AK Ajibade SAN on Nov 1, 2025, he immediately lost the constitutional authority vested in him under Article 42(1) of the PDP Constitution to act on behalf of the party.

The court stated:

“Upon his suspension on 1st Nov, 2025, the erstwhile Legal Adviser of PDP A. K. Ajibade SAN lost the authority the party constitution conferred on him and so acted without authority when he filed any action and or appeal thereafter.”

The implication of that order is clear. The court was laying down a constitutional principle applicable to all party officials operating under the PDP Constitution. It was not creating a rule applicable only to Ajibade personally.

The court further held:

“Any appeal filed by A. K. Ajibade SAN or anyone authorized by him from 1st Nov, 2025 until the end of his suspension had no potency. The same is incompetent and must be struck out as an appeal filed by counsel without authorization.”

That order formed the foundation upon which the cross appeal eventually collapsed.

The attempt to isolate Ajibade from the other suspended officials is therefore dishonest and legally unsustainable. In law, once a court establishes a governing principle, it applies to all persons operating under identical legal circumstances. That is the essence of the doctrine of mutatis mutandis.

The suspension was collective. The constitutional consequences were equally collective.

If the court held that a suspended National Legal Adviser lacked authority to act for the party, then every official suspended under the same instrument suffers the same constitutional incapacity. The court was not required to recite every suspended official’s name individually before the principle could apply to them. Courts pronounce on principles; names merely provide factual context.

This is precisely why the argument being pushed by the Wike camp collapses completely.

Ironically, the same judgment formed the processes relied upon by Chief J. B. Daudu SAN in the apex court proceedings in filing the cross appeal. They cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously.

Even more contradictory is the role of Mohammed Abdurrahman. He was reportedly among those who signed the suspension of the controversial four officials. Yet, one of the same suspended officials later appointed him chairman. If the suspension was valid enough for him to help enforce, how then does the same camp argue that the constitutional consequences of that suspension suddenly disappeared?

The truth remains that political parties are bound by their constitutions. Once the PDP Constitution stripped suspended officials of authority to act, every subsequent action undertaken in defiance of that suspension became fundamentally defective.

No amount of propaganda can cure a constitutional defect.

What the judgment established was not merely a dispute over names; it was a definitive statement on authority, competence, and constitutional limitation within party administration. Once authority is lost, every action founded on it automatically collapses.